There Is Finally an Alternative: Jeff deGraaf on Real Yields, Bubble Signals, and Credit That Keeps Getting Worse

Notes from The Meb Faber Show #657 (2026-11-13). RenMac's Jeff deGraaf on what a 2%-plus real yield means for allocation, how his bubble indicator fired on semiconductors in April, and why he calls credit 'stably deteriorating'. Educational discussion of method, not investment advice; no tickers, no price targets.
Contents
- 1873: John Bull can’t stand 2%
- Newton’s year: it got him too
- From the crisis to 2022: fifteen years of no alternative
- Late April 2026: the bubble indicator fires
- Summer into autumn: when the market goes one-dimensional
- Now: credit springs the first leak
- What to watch next: it’s short on time
- ”Real yields are back — should I swap stocks for bonds now?”
- “I’m already stuck in the names that doubled — cut or hold?”
- Sources worth your time
- One thing to take with you

“I have a thousand coins at my waist. They are heavy. That is why I fall behind.” “Why not let them go?” He made no answer, and shook his head. Before long he tired further.
— Liu Zongyuan, “Lament for the Drowned” (Tang dynasty, c. 9th century; my own translation)
On The Meb Faber Show #657, published 13 November 2026, Jeff deGraaf — chairman and head of technical research at RenMac (Renaissance Macro Research) — said the Treasury real yield, nominal minus inflation expectations, sits at 2.65%, and was 2.90% the week they published their note. Once that number clears 2%, bonds compete with stocks again: he walked Meb through the arithmetic, where an 85/15 stock-bond mix aiming at a 7% target can be replaced by something closer to 65/35 with far less volatility. He drew his own boundary around it: a real yield above 2% is not evidence that equities underperform — there is no such evidence in the data — what changes is how much volatility you swallow for the same return. Separately, their bubble indicator fired on semiconductors in late April, and he thinks this unwind is short on time rather than price, with the landing zone in 2027.
1873: John Bull can’t stand 2%
The episode starts from a note deGraaf wrote this year — Meb called it one of his favourite pieces of 2026. It opens in 1873 with Walter Bagehot, then editor of The Economist, and his line that John Bull can stand many things but cannot stand 2%. That was a hard-money era. Below 2%, savers got itchy and moved money out of the local bank and into Central and South American railroad bonds at nine, ten, twelve percent — most of which defaulted within four or five years. That 2% line measures human patience: under it, most people go looking for a substitute that sounds reasonable.
Newton’s year: it got him too
Meb laughed that we can mock the buyers of Honduran railroad bonds, and then SPACs show up a century and a half later. deGraaf’s answer was Newton. In December 1719 he owned South Sea Company stock; by the end of February he had quintupled his money and took it out — then sat on his hands and watched it triple from there. By early summer he put back not only his gains but his Bank of England shares too, buying South Sea within two or three weeks of the final top. Ten years later he died with a substantial part of his estate still in the company we now call a bubble. This was the man who invented calculus. The seduction is not rational, and it works on rational people anyway.
From the crisis to 2022: fifteen years of no alternative
From the financial crisis to roughly 2022, quantitative easing pushed real rates negative — owning those bonds cost you money, which is why central banks held them while everyone else was forced out the risk curve. TINA: there is no alternative. SPACs — blank-cheque vehicles that raise first and find something to buy later — were that era’s Honduran railroads.
deGraaf’s comparison nails what is different now. When TINA began, the S&P’s free cash flow to enterprise value — the market’s yield, as he puts it — was about 4.5%. Today it is around 2.75%, level with the real yield. Real versus real, they finally compete. So the choice has changed shape: on one side the S&P, which he says they don’t judge on valuation but which is by no means cheap, with all of its volatility attached; on the other, a comparable real return contractually guaranteed for five to ten years.
He doesn’t expect a thunderclap. Hopes, desires and frankly greed persist until people start taking losses, so he expects a gradual shift — and the AI semiconductor unwind may be the opening. Meb added a RenMac table going back to 1953 that sorts the equity-bond return gap into quintiles: the current one is the second worst, with stocks winning only 63% of the time and winning by less.
Late April 2026: the bubble indicator fires
The definition is clean enough to be almost un-technical: a diversified index doubling within two years from a high — not from a low, from an all-time high. The Hang Seng, biotech, semiconductors, China in 2008. For commodities and single stocks the window shrinks to six months.
Technicians don’t usually believe in V-tops, he says, because things rarely go straight up and straight back down. After a bubble signal, the odds of a V-top rise sharply, so the usual breakdown-and-crossover toolkit gets swapped out. What do you do once it fires? Buy it for three months: 80% of the time that stretch is higher. At six months it’s closer to a coin flip, and by then it is rolling over. He calls the method shooting them in the back — you don’t shoot it on the way up, because that hands you Newton’s FOMO and you pile back in at the end.
The reasoning is worth copying down. He can’t tell you whether it goes up another 80% or another 20%. He knows you are on borrowed time from the signal onward, and that wherever it peaks it comes all the way back to where the signal fired. Take a million to seven million and shoot it in the back, you may keep six or five, and you will mourn that missing two million — but the person selling into strength got out at two, maybe three. Terminal wealth favours the first path.
The day it fired he was at Stagecoach, the festival at Coachella; he went on TV and said three months, then it gets dicey. Semis peaked around 22 June, about two months after the signal.
Summer into autumn: when the market goes one-dimensional
Participants narrow to one thing — memory, margins, three years of capacity sold out, so it can’t go down. His standard operating procedure is to ask what can go wrong at exactly that moment, and in midsummer the answer was credit, which nobody was looking at on the semi side. During the tariff tantrum the crowd was one-dimensionally focused on the damage, and his question then was what can go right. Both worked. He quoted the Greek whose name he can never remember: you never stand in the same river twice. The river of May and June isn’t September’s — compute, financing, regulation, it will be something.
The part I keep coming back to is the revisions argument. People say they’ll just watch estimates get cut. RenMac rebuilt the 2000 cycle with point-in-time data: by the first downward revision the stocks were already down 40%. The analysts fall into the same psychological traps as everyone else. It feels logical, and the data says it doesn’t work.
Now: credit springs the first leak
Higher real rates are a tightening of financial conditions, and tightening seeps into credit quality. CCC, the lowest rung of the ratings ladder, runs spreads around 1,200 basis points, with a much lower median — four or five issuers carry most of the stress, cable names among them. Their breadth gauge is the share of names trading below 80 cents on the dollar, the dividing line between good credit and shaky credit: about 7% now, not terrible, and expanding. On BBs their trigger is 200 basis points; it reads 196. He also flagged a set of large cloud-related issuers whose paper is quoted at its widest in two years.
Private credit is a creature of post-crisis regulation: banks could no longer hold those loans, so private lenders took the niche and became shadow banking. His test is that any part of financials growing fast for a long stretch deserves worry, because growing the book means loosening standards — covenant-light deals, collateral that never adds up, First Brands last year, cars driven to chop shops in Mexico. You couldn’t make it up.
Most of this paper floats, and much of it was struck in the zero-real-rate SPAC era, so payments get heavier as rates reset. Public markets show stress in CCC spreads, banks in write-downs; the private side is opaque. What he watches is gates: investors ask for 7%, 10%, 12% of their money back, the fund grants 5% and the rest queue. Hence the line I wrote down — I don’t have a solvency problem, I have a liquidity problem. Those are the same thing. A liquidity problem that runs long enough is a solvency problem. His phrase for the state of it: stably deteriorating. Not systemic, not a crisis; a scab that won’t heal.
What to watch next: it’s short on time
Meb asked what turns stably deteriorating into plain deteriorating. Back to public markets: the breadth of CCC stress and whether the below-80 bucket keeps building. He uses a rock pushed uphill — you know the burden going up, and once it crests the peak stopping it is much harder. He thinks we haven’t crested.
On semis he says we’re midway through, maybe a bit more, and what’s missing is time: no first downward revision yet, then a feeding frenzy of cuts, then regulation or whatever it turns out to be, then the disgust phase with ETF outflows and options pressing the downside. Sentiment is back to neutral without a washout. Scripted historically the window is about thirteen months, putting it next July — you could drive a truck through the deviation, but he calls it a 2027 event.
Then the most durable piece of method in the episode: separate the condition from the trigger. Their market cycle clock puts inflation on the y-axis and growth on the x-axis across nine zones with data back to the mid-1940s. Today sits in the top third for inflation and near the top third for growth — historically the worst zone for S&P annualised returns, still positive, by about 40 basis points. They don’t sell because of the zone. The zone decides how many chips go into the middle; the technicals decide when. Fuel in the tank versus the spark: fuel without a spark means nothing to do, and both together can make a loud noise.
The real-yield switch follows the same discipline. Acting at the 2% print tests worse. Letting it run from two to three to four and waiting for it to roll back over with technical confirmation tests significantly better. Having the market on your side, he says, makes a big difference.
”Real yields are back — should I swap stocks for bonds now?”
This was my first thought too, and here’s how I’d sort it. First, decide whether your problem is return or volatility. A 2%-plus real yield is no evidence equities lose; the 65/35 arithmetic solves for how much movement you swallow to reach the same target. If your pain is not sleeping, this helps; if your pain is not earning enough, it doesn’t.
Second, the concave strategy deserves a look. A 60/40 that drifts to 70/30 sells the excess equity and comes back to 60/40. Its value shows up on the way down: in a 15–20% correction you have something to move — 65/35 can be allowed to fall to 50/50, then rebalanced next quarter, which means selling bonds at a gain and buying stocks lower. Many portfolios today have no cushion at all and nothing to reallocate.
Third, he doesn’t pull the trigger on the 2% print, and the episode gives no entry level. I’m not going to invent one for him.
“I’m already stuck in the names that doubled — cut or hold?”
Harder question. His framework hands you a level rather than a date: borrowed time gets repaid, and it gets repaid back at the signal. An anxious holder wants the date; the level is the part you can execute.
Meb offered a version a long-only holder can use: no need to sell or short — stop rebalancing into them, stop reinvesting dividends there. That turns a cut-or-hold binary into something you can execute once a month.
Then position sizing. Meb says people hem and haw over a decision, and when you ask what percentage of the portfolio it is, the answer makes the decision meaningless. deGraaf notes the quants all volatility-adjust, while the large group he jokes about as B-plus to A-minus investors rarely ask whether each position carries proportional risk. He closed with the line about conviction: the only difference between conviction and stubbornness is the outcome. Miss it and you were stubborn; get it right with the market agreeing and it was conviction. Nothing wrong with conviction, he says, as long as you stay malleable and undogmatic.
Sources worth your time
- The Meb Faber Show #657, 13 November 2026, with Jeff deGraaf; show notes at mebfaber.com.
- RenMac (renmac.com) and their Friday podcast, RenMac Offscript, with deGraaf, Neil Dutta and Steve Pavlick.
- Walter Bagehot’s 1873 writing and the British money market of that era; Newton and the South Sea Company appear in most financial histories.
- Introductory material on the Kelly criterion and volatility-adjusted position sizing.
One thing to take with you
Letting go is hard because most people leave the decision until the moment itself. The man in Liu Zongyuan’s piece could do the arithmetic between a thousand coins and his own life, but he was doing it in the water. deGraaf’s bubble indicator isn’t mysterious either — before the river rises, it writes down the level at which he leaves, in a sentence someone else could check.
Here’s something I’ve tried: pick one thing you’re holding that keeps getting heavier — it needn’t be a stock. A habit you tolerate in a relationship, a side project three years in with nothing to show, a job title you can’t bear to drop. Write one line: “If X happens, I let it go.” X has to be a fact someone else could see (a mood does not count). Date it, and come back in three months to see whether the sentence still holds.
This article is an educational discussion of investment method. It is not advice to buy or sell any individual security, offers no target prices, and does not analyze any current holding. Investing carries risk; make your own decisions or consult a qualified professional.
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