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Macro Musings notes: the same sentence killed a coin five years ago and now carries one

A clearing house hall at night, in the foreground an open ledger lit by a desk lamp with a stack of silver coins and a sealed certificate beside it, the same hall receding deep into the frame where the row of teller windows sits unlit

The 9 November 2026 episode of Macro Musings was recorded live at Wharton's conference on the law and economics of payments, with host David Beckworth, Visa Institute president Todd Fox, and Fidelity's head of global policy Martha Miller. Fox reduces the gap between OpenUSD and Libra to two things: reserves you can name because regulation spells them out, and the fact that Libra was a white paper. Miller adds the test — when the value comes from interoperability, consortium value skyrockets. Educational notes, not investment advice, no tickers, no price targets, and my reading may be wrong.

  • stablecoins
  • payment systems
  • podcast notes
  • financial regulation
  • consortium governance
Contents
  1. A room full of former guests, and a question the host pushed
  2. The first difference is in the name
  3. The second difference: back then there was a white paper
  4. When joint governance is worth paying for
  5. Why this isn’t just “because it was Facebook”
  6. A big company announces a coin — what can someone like me actually look at
  7. A few other things worth keeping
  8. Worth a look
  9. The one thing to take with you

A clearing house hall at night, in the foreground an open ledger lit by a desk lamp with a stack of silver coins and a sealed certificate beside it, the same hall receding deep into the frame where the row of teller windows sits unlit

When the uncarved block is scattered it becomes vessels; the sage uses it and becomes the chief of officers. So the great ordering does not cut things apart.

—— Laozi, Tao Te Ching, chapter 28 (Spring and Autumn period; my own translation)

The 9 November 2026 episode of Macro Musings was recorded live at a conference on the law and economics of payments at Wharton, where David Beckworth hosted Todd Fox, president of the Visa Institute, and Martha Miller, head of global policy at Fidelity Investments. What stayed with me longest is Fox taking apart the difference between OpenUSD and Libra. He picks two points: the first is in the name — OpenUSD is the dollar, compliant with the Genius Act and backed by high-quality liquid assets that regulation spells out in black and white — and the second is that Libra, at the time, amounted to a white paper, some signed NDAs and a meeting that hadn’t happened yet, with reserves that might have been an undefined basket of currencies. One condition on that read: Fox says he was around during the Libra era and is describing the side he saw, and Libra sat five or six years ahead of any regulatory movement in this space.

A room full of former guests, and a question the host pushed

The episode opens with Beckworth asking former guests in the audience to raise their hands; 60% of the hands go up, and Fox says he bought all their books. The show usually seats academics and public-sector people. This time both guests do policy from inside private firms: Fox is in San Francisco, 3,000 miles from the center of federal decision-making, and Miller runs public policy and regulatory strategy at Fidelity.

Fox’s reason for being there: when the systems underneath are being swapped out, government’s job is to understand them, and that understanding can only come from the companies building and deploying the technology — he says what people were discussing a year ago looks obsolete today. Miller calls her role translator. People see policy and advocacy and assume someone walks in to hand you one version of the facts that supports the outcome they want; what she does is surface the salient things different institutions are each sitting on, so the conversation runs on a shared set of facts.

On the left, a single line runs from one source straight to a preset conclusion; on the right, four lines first converge onto a shared baseline before discussion grows upward from it.

With that laid down, Beckworth pushes the conversation to stablecoins and then pushes Fox: OpenUSD, a dollar stablecoin with a wide group of participating organizations, keeps reminding him of Libra. Libra was Facebook’s multi-currency global stablecoin project, and the financial stability community pumped the brakes before it ever launched. Same shape, dead five years ago, viable now. Where’s the difference?

The first difference is in the name

The USD in OpenUSD is the dollar. It has to comply with the Genius Act, it is backed by high-quality liquid assets, that requirement is laid out in regulation, and what you ultimately get back is dollars.

On Libra, Fox’s account is that it wasn’t clear the thing would be backed by US dollars, let alone by high-quality liquid assets. It might have been some undefined basket of currencies, possibly with non-fiat money in it. For central banks, that was too murky.

It sounds like a detail. Its force is that it decides whether the question “who pays on the day this breaks” has an answer at all. A reserve list written into regulation is something any outsider can check against; a basket still being negotiated is something whose behavior under stress the issuer hasn’t worked out either.

On the left, a stack of solid-line blocks forms a list outsiders have something to check against; on the right, a dashed bag holds a few blurry blocks marked with question marks, with nothing to check against.

The second difference: back then there was a white paper

Fox was around during the Libra era himself. His description: it was a white paper, some companies signed NDAs, there was a plan to have a meeting and figure out what they were going to do, and then the financial stability community said whoa, pump the brakes, and it never really got off the ground.

He adds a third point I think explains more than the first two. When Libra was first contemplated, the number of people in central banking really following crypto and stablecoins wasn’t zero, but it was not a popular topic. Now he trades views with people at the IMF and the Bank for International Settlements who follow the space as closely as he does and raise angles he hadn’t considered. His conclusion: the innovation is mostly good, the timing is what matters, and back then neither side understood the thing well enough to hold a good-faith conversation about it.

On a single timeline, the left marker sits on the dashed segment where the rules do not yet exist, the right marker sits on the solid segment, and the gap between them is labeled five to six years.

He also names the structural problem. Fintech has this notion of permissionless innovation: build something small, test and learn, and if it goes badly there’s no systemic risk. But some companies in that consortium had a large user base, and the fear was that the thing would become systemic while everyone was still working out what went in the basket.

On the left, a small block rests on an intact floor; on the right, a very large block presses on the same floor and the floor cracks open.

When joint governance is worth paying for

Asked for her outlook on OpenUSD, Miller reframes the question: when a group comes together to do this, what’s the value proposition?

Her answer carries a test. When much of the value derives from interoperability — and fungibility and interoperability are exactly what everyone is asking about stablecoins — consortium value skyrockets. She points to Zelle: the whole point was moving things between banks, and it made no sense for each institution to build its own technology with its own proprietary API that didn’t speak clearly and didn’t get updated. A consortium behind it makes sense. Akoya providing API backing is the same story, a group coming together. She says the shape repeats: the institution with the best idea is often not the one best positioned to solve the problem.

The test also hands you its failure condition. Where the value doesn’t come from interoperability, the consortium premium disappears — if one issuer’s coin is already accepted by everyone, joint governance leaves you with meeting costs.

A curve rises from the lower left to the upper right, with how much value comes from interoperability on the horizontal axis and what the alliance is worth on the vertical axis, hugging the floor at the left end and lifting high at the right.

And she adds what actually scared people about Libra: it was not largely financial institutions making headway. Those companies had the technical expertise to build it, but no history of prudential oversight, no examiners coming in to look at them, and so no exposure to the lessons of finance and monetary policy that keep coming back. Her line: those are rarely net new lessons, it’s the same thing learned again on a new set of facts.

Why this isn’t just “because it was Facebook”

The cheap explanation is that regulators disliked Facebook, so Libra died. The material in this episode points somewhere else: if the reserve list had been writable at the time and checkable against existing rules, that conversation would have gone differently. Fox does the arithmetic — Libra sat five or six years ahead of regulatory movement in this space, so the rules weren’t there to check against.

How do you separate the two versions? Look at now. OpenUSD counts participants with real scale and real user bases; under a “big companies may not touch this” logic it should have been stopped too. It wasn’t, and the difference lands on the reserves and the regulatory position. Fidelity’s own stablecoin is the companion case: Miller describes a long stretch of educating policymakers and legislators on why they’re building it, why they want to do it in the US, why they didn’t go overseas for it, and says she’s pleased with where things have landed.

The same two balls drop toward two different sieves: the left sieve stops both, while the right sieve stops one and lets the other fall through a gap.

The failure condition for my read, written down: this was a live panel at a payments conference, both guests were describing the side their own firms sit on, and nobody in the room was there to represent the regulators who hit the brakes. Fox said as much from the stage — if I’m getting this wrong, the prudential regulators of that era in this room should tell us.

A big company announces a coin — what can someone like me actually look at

My old first move with announcements like this was guessing which tickers it would move. This episode handed me three usable questions instead, none of which need inside information.

One: what are the reserves, and where are they written. Reserves named in regulation that any outsider can check against is one state; a white paper saying “a basket” is another. Two: who is in the joint governance, and have those participants ever had examiners walk in. Three: how much of this thing’s value comes from interoperability — if it does, the consortium shape earns its keep; if it doesn’t, a group of companies announcing together is a large group photo.

Those three won’t stop me from being wrong. They do stop me from mistaking an announcement’s volume for structure.

A few other things worth keeping

  • Fox brings up a 1974 Boston Fed conference on electronic funds transfer systems. Most of the people there were describing how to build a better version of a check with a computer, and Dee Hock, founder of what became Visa, gave remarks saying that perpetuating existing forms leads to the commercial graveyard, where the ghosts of form which do not follow function are buried.
  • What Hock actually achieved with 1970s technology, Fox says, was a layer on top of existing financial market infrastructure that abstracted the friction away. The friction was all still there, just invisible to the consumer and the merchant. His read is that the 1974 vision is only now happening below the abstraction layer: money moving in real time on chain, the orchestrated intermediaries behind the scenes getting rewired, and a whole new set of risks and opportunities appearing with it.
  • Fidelity started experimenting with crypto mining and Bitcoin from an R&D angle back in 2013. Miller says the claim to fame they used to hype was being the first mutual fund company with a website, which is no longer a line worth saying out loud. People called this stuff internet funny money then, and their view was that if they weren’t hands-on, they wouldn’t know what was coming next. The hypothesis behind their own stablecoin wasn’t that this is where everyone parks money either — it was that trading and settlement plumbing might change underneath — and for a tinkerer, rolling up your sleeves is the fastest way to understand something.
  • How Visa’s crypto cards got built, Fox says, came out of the Fidelity partnership: money sitting in a mutual fund makes an asset-backed card you can spend against. Functionally that isn’t far from a checking account, an unsecured line of credit, or assets in a brokerage account — the value is yours, you decide how to handle it, and you should be able to spend it at every merchant you want to give your business to. Beckworth notes this is effectively the equity-based money John Cochrane has talked about for years, and that seeing something like it in practice is pretty cool.
  • Miller’s line I’ll keep is the onion layer. She says people hear policy and reach for the word wonk, while her entire job is translating this into what happens to real people and customers, traced all the way through. Stopping at “that cost this” or “there’s a compliance build here” is stopping at the intermediary layer — interesting, important, never the purpose.
  • She uses the accelerator gap to describe regulation and technology diverging in speed, and puts the pressure outside the industry: the benchmark for customer expectations grows out of free shipping, drone delivery and talking to the voice assistant in your house, and then that whole expectation set gets applied to regulated domains. She says health care is grappling with the same thing.

Worth a look

  • Macro Musings with David Beckworth, 9 November 2026, recorded live at Wharton’s conference on the law and economics of payments — the source for this piece
  • The Genius Act provisions on stablecoin reserve assets
  • Dee Hock’s “electronic value exchange” remarks at the 1974 Boston Fed conference on electronic funds transfer
  • Visa Economic Empowerment Institute work comparing stablecoin regimes in Hong Kong, the US, the EU under MiCA, and the UAE
  • The Libra white paper, and the contemporaneous commentary from the Financial Stability Board and central banks
  • Public governance material on Zelle and Akoya
  • John Cochrane’s writing on equity-based money

The one thing to take with you

Whether a promise can be checked by someone outside it decides whether it counts as a promise. A reserve list written into regulation is something anyone can look up; a basket still under negotiation leaves the person across from you nothing to verify, however sincere the pitch.

Something I tried: take one thing you promised someone this week and rewrite it into a shape they can confirm without asking you — give a date, or give a place they can see. The first time I did that, I found there wasn’t a single word in my original sentence that the other person could have verified.

On the left, the box in the other party's hands is an empty dashed frame; on the right, the same box holds one block for a date and one block for a place.

This article is an educational discussion of investment method. It is not advice to buy or sell any individual security, offers no target prices, and does not analyze any current holding. Investing carries risk; make your own decisions or consult a qualified professional.

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