# Odd Lots: Profits Were Still Rising and a 95-Year-Old Law Firm Dissolved Anyway Source: Realpha Blog (blog.getrealpha.com) Original article and charts: https://blog.getrealpha.com/en/blog/oddlots-2026-11-13-why-a-2-billion-law-firm-suddenly-collapsed/ > Notes on the Odd Lots episode published 13 November 2026 and recorded on 10 November, where Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway talk with Yale Law School professor John Morley about the dissolution of Weil, Gotshal & Manges: a 95-year-old firm that worked on the General Motors and Lehman Brothers bankruptcies, whose profits kept growing while its profits-per-partner rank slipped from ninth in 2020 to around twentieth in 2025 (Morley's own figure, hedged with 'I think'), until a star partner's September exit became the final straw. Morley states he has no inside knowledge and is reasoning from news reports, and the pay figures in the interview are his hypothetical illustrations. Educational listening notes only — no investment advice, no price targets, and the judgements here may be wrong. Published: 2026-11-13 Locale: en Tags: partnership model, podcast-notes, organizational collapse, ownership structure, big law ![A partners' conference room at dusk, a half-packed banker's box and a face-down brass nameplate at the near end of the long table, a dozen chairs pushed back at odd angles, the table receding into blue shadow in front of floor-to-ceiling windows](/covers/oddlots-2026-11-13-why-a-2-billion-law-firm-suddenly-collapsed-cover.png) > Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold; mere anarchy is loosed upon the world. > > —— W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming" (1919) The Odd Lots episode published on 13 November 2026 was recorded on 10 November, with Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway hosting John Morley, a professor at Yale Law School, on why Weil, Gotshal & Manges — 95 years old, counsel on the General Motors and Lehman Brothers bankruptcies — came apart in a matter of months. Morley's paper argues that a firm can fail while carrying almost no debt and while its profits are still rising, so long as they rise more slowly than its peers': Weil's rank by profits per partner fell from ninth in 2020 to around twentieth in 2025, a figure he hedged with "I think." He said he has no inside knowledge and is reasoning from news reports, and the pay numbers in the interview are hypotheticals he made up to show the arithmetic. ## The strongest version of his case: rising profits, and a run anyway He calls it declining relative profitability — the absolute numbers go up while the ranking goes down. The question is how a ranking turns into a dissolution. ![Two lines diverge from left to right: one shows absolute profit rising gradually, while the other marks only two peer-ranking points, falling from ninth place toward about twentieth.](/figures/relative-profit-decline-en.svg) Two steps. First, the firm. A partner who leaves with clients takes the revenue that same day, and the costs will not come off. The lease on that corner office is still there; there might be pensions owed to retired partners, there might be bank debt; and a tax partner lives on deals brought in by the M&A partners, so once the M&A people go, the tax people still have to be paid and have nothing to work on. Revenue can be cut overnight, while costs keep coming due on contract. At Weil, he says, there were no bank borrowings and the creditors are a few landlords, basically. ![On the same timeline, the revenue line plunges vertically below the cost line on a single day, while the cost line stays flat and a shaded gap opens between them afterward.](/figures/revenue-cliff-cost-floor-en.svg) Second, the partners, and this is his hardest piece of reasoning. Partners are paid in shares of profit, so when revenue falls and costs hold, profit has to fall; that part is arithmetic. The heavier part is fraudulent transfer liability. Bankruptcy law stops a debtor from giving assets away on the eve of failure, and under that doctrine a distribution of profits counts as a giveaway because it never had to be paid at all. An administrative assistant who has worked two weeks has accrued a contractual debt; a partner has a discretionary distribution, and he points at Berkshire Hathaway sitting on billions in profit it has never paid out. So after a firm winds down, the creditors arrive, name a stretch of months during which they say it was already insolvent, and ask for every dollar paid to partners in that window. The partners say they were workers and those were wages. The courts say they were owners. ![On the left, a one-way arrow delivers money to an assistant and stops; on the right, after money reaches a partner, another arrow curves back to the firm to show that it must be returned.](/figures/wage-claim-vs-discretionary-draw-en.svg) Which means every partner is running three calculations daily. You may not wake up asking "should I stay or should I go," he says, but the decision is there every morning. The first is pay: his illustration is a partner on five million dollars with four million offered across the street, and once the five becomes 3.9, people move. The second is liability: suppose I put the odds of this firm being gone by February at even, and suppose more than half my pay only lands in January after the prior year's books are settled — then the two million dollars nominally coming to me between now and February is worth half that, and the 1.5 million from the firm down the road looks like a pay cut on paper while being a raise with less risk. The third is whether my own practice survives: once the people who bring work in have gone, whoever is left stops looking productive even to his own managing partners. What makes the first two actionable at any moment is Rule 5.6. The American Bar Association's model rules bar a lawyer from signing anything that restricts their right to practise, so there are no non-competes. Britain has no such rule and firms there generally require them. He thinks this explains the absence of private equity better than the ban on non-lawyer ownership does: you pay a fortune to buy out the partners' equity and they can walk the next day. The control case is Slater & Gordon. Australia loosened its ownership rules in the 1990s, the firm listed, spent the proceeds on acquisitions, and one of them — Quindell — turned out to have cooked books, leaving it insolvent the way an auto parts maker that bought the wrong thing would be. It went to the hedge funds and banks that had lent it money, wiped the equity, converted junior debt to equity, split the Australian and British businesses, and both are still trading. The difference is that the lawyers were not owners: their pay did not fall when the business did, and they carried no liability when it failed. His line is the hinge of the whole episode — in an investor-owned firm you can sell your shares, but you cannot withdraw the slice of the firm's assets behind them, so the money stays inside. Had Weil told its equity holders they were wiped out, they would have walked to Cravath. ![The container on the left has an open bottom, letting dots leak downward along an arrow; the container on the right has a sealed bottom, keeping the dots inside while exchanges occur only outside it.](/figures/open-bottom-vs-closed-bottom-en.svg) Push the same logic forward and you get the project he calls generational conflict. A share of Microsoft lasts as long as the company, so even if I sell next week I am happy for it to spend today on technology that pays off in ten years, because next week's price will price that in. A partner's equity is extinguished on the day he retires and nobody buys it back, so his prediction is that firms will rent AI and not develop it: they renovate office space, they do not buy office space. ![The upper line continues all the way to the right past the sale point; the lower line ends on the retirement date, leaving only a gray dashed segment afterward.](/figures/equity-expiry-shortens-horizon-en.svg) ## The other side: the same structure, and nobody ran in 1975 The strongest objection comes out of his own mouth. Lateral hiring, he says, was ultimately a norms thing: in 1975 nothing stopped a partner leaving Cravath for Kirkland & Ellis, the structure was what it is today, and they simply did not do it until roughly the last twenty years. The structure supplies the conditions for a run; what pulled the trigger was a change in norms, and the explanation for that change sits outside his equations. The second objection stands opposite him: Wachtell and Cravath are partner-owned too, both get poached from heavily, and both are still here. Mike Aiello, the rainmaker whose September departure he calls the final straw, left Weil for Cravath, wanting the smaller familial feel the old Weil used to have. If partner ownership were the fatal defect, those two should be the most fragile firms in the market. His own account is that they make it work by doing only the very top end of the market, and that even they are being poached from and under profound pressure — same structure, same raiding, one dissolution and two survivors, which the ownership form alone cannot explain. ![Three paths branch from the same starting point: the upper path breaks into fragments, the middle path continues right beyond the frame, and the lower thin line is absorbed into a thick line.](/figures/same-structure-three-endings-en.svg) Third, the thing that actually lit the fire is not in the three calculations. The moment he decided the end was inevitable, he says, was learning that Ramona Nee would not become chair and that there was a dispute over whether she had known for months without telling the other partners. He then quotes Roosevelt on having nothing to fear but fear itself, describes a law firm collapse as a crisis of confidence, and adds that Weil had, by all accounts, a toxic governance culture — a point that only surfaces near the end of the interview. Tracy read a story crossing the terminal while they were recording: the partners had voted to dissolve and named a wind-down committee. Her sharpest addition was that the woman who turned down the chair had been hired by Kirkland & Ellis. There is a quieter objection too: he offers a second explanation of his own and never says which one carries more weight. Law firms, he says, are microcosms of modernity, with one-person-one-vote rules and systems of redistribution like nations, while all of human life has become more calculated, more self-interested, more commercial and less familial — Cravath partners used to serve as pallbearers at a partner's funeral, and that is fading, which is part of why there is a loneliness crisis. That story also covers why lateral hiring only exploded in the last twenty years. It just has no equations, so it never enters the model. Fourth, he concedes Weil's strategy was "not crazy" at the time and that the error was holding it too long. Joe's follow-up is sharper still: those conservative calls around 2010 may have been rational at the time, and on his own loose guess at the dates the people who made them retired in 2021. Cadwalader took the same no-growth path and ended up merging into Hogan Lovells, a firm with less history than its own. Same ownership structure, one dissolution and one merger, so something else is doing work in between. Fifth, investor-owned firms fail as well. Joe opened the episode by recalling that when banks were failing one after another in 2008, people said it would not have happened had they stayed partnerships — and his own conclusion is that partnerships are not immune either. One step further, which is mine and not the episode's: investor ownership shifts the run from partners to creditors. Slater & Gordon survived because its hedge funds and banks were willing to sit down and swap debt for equity, which is a negotiated outcome rather than something the share structure guarantees. Sixth, the generational conflict prediction is hard to test. He says of Kirkland's 500 million dollars, "who's keeping track," admits he does not know what counts as an AI investment, and notes that firms have every incentive to characterise a lot of spending that way. A prediction whose numerator and denominator are both undefined cannot be scored from outside. ## Which side holds up, and the condition that decides it The two sides are answering different questions. The objections win on "why Weil, and why 2026": that needs the shift in norms, the strategy held too long, the collapse of trust in management, and the timing of one man's exit in September. His framework wins on "why it cannot be stopped once it starts," and that needs a single condition — whether an equity holder can unilaterally withdraw their own slice of the capital. ![On the left, four arrows from different directions strike the same point like one-time impacts; on the right, a ball rolls down a descending slope.](/figures/trigger-versus-slope-en.svg) That condition sorts the cases. Weil's partners could leave with the clients, and leaving early stopped their clawback exposure accruing past that day, so the slide from decline to dissolution took months. Slater & Gordon's shareholders could only sell shares while the money stayed in the firm, so it had the time to negotiate its way to a restructuring. The relative decline was the same in both; the path diverged on that one variable. ![Two horizontal bars differ greatly in length: the upper bar ends quickly, while the lower bar is much longer and has an arrow at its right end, indicating no endpoint.](/figures/months-versus-open-ended-en.svg) Bringing it home, here is the first thing that nags at me as a holder: the financials grow every year, so why does the position keep bleeding? I have been wrong on this one. Absolute numbers are reassuring — revenue up, profit up, nothing to see. Relative profitability offers a second reading: when peers grow faster, the people inside who can take something with them do that arithmetic first, and they move before the share price does. The checkable version is concrete. How many people carrying clients or product lines left in the last twelve months, where did they go, and are the customers attached to the company or to a person? The episode supplies the mechanism: Weil's management wanted clients institutionalised, while an eat-what-you-kill comp system pays people for tying client loyalty to themselves. The firm paid for the result it did not want. Morley calls it an optimisation problem with two variables in tension. The second nag: my fund keeps shrinking, so should I redeem too? He puts law firms in a category he calls impermanent equity businesses — hedge funds and mutual funds where redemption extinguishes your interest, mutual insurers where you stop being an owner when you stop renewing. That category is structurally vulnerable to runs for exactly Weil's reason: whoever leaves first takes money out, and whoever stays absorbs the costs that will not come off. So the things worth reading are the lock-up, the gates, and who the largest investors are, with the performance table somewhere further down. Part of what I hold is in ETFs, and this logic has to be redone there, because ETF redemption works differently from a mutual fund's — the episode does not touch that, and it is my own homework. ![Two equal-length bars are divided into different numbers of sections: the left has six sections with six people below, while the right has only three sections, each twice as wide, with only three people below.](/figures/fixed-cost-split-fewer-people-en.svg) Here is where I would be wrong. If some partner-owned firm slips further down the rankings than Weil did, loses its marquee partners, and still does not come apart, go look at its comp and lock-up terms; the answer should show up in the column marked "how much a departing partner can take." ## Worth reading alongside - The Odd Lots episode of 13 November 2026 (the hosts give 10 November as the recording date), the source for this piece - John Morley's academic paper on law firm collapse and partner runs, plus the new project on generational conflict he says he recently put online - Henry Hansmann's work on the ownership of enterprise, whom Morley names as his teacher and mentor - Rule 5.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the provisions on non-lawyer ownership, along with the Arizona and Utah variants - The public record of Slater & Gordon's restructuring after the Quindell acquisition - Ernest Renan's 1882 essay "What Is a Nation?", the source of the "daily referendum" line Joe quotes - The record of claims brought against partners in the Dewey & LeBoeuf bankruptcy ## The one thing to take with you **How long an organisation lasts depends on how much its members can carry out of the door.** The whole episode circles this. The partner who can take the clients leaves, and the revenue is gone that day. The partner who cannot take equity with him has no reason to spend on anyone who will be there in five years. And a system that extinguishes your stake on the day you retire is telling everyone to plan only to the end of their own tenure. Weil's lease could not be carried out of the door, nor could a landlord's claim on the last ten years of it; the clients could — put those together and a dissolution within months is already written. Joe brings up that 1882 essay on what a nation is, which calls a nation a daily referendum: we do not vote every day, yet every day we decide whether to carry on together. ![A box represents the organization; the arrow of the topmost item inside crosses the right border and continues outside, while the arrows of the items below it all stop dead against the thickened border.](/figures/what-walks-out-with-you-en.svg) Something I have tried that works outside investing too. Pick one organisation or relationship you are inside — a company, a team, a book club, your family — and take a sheet of paper. On the left, write the three things you would carry out with you if you left tomorrow. On the right, the three things you could not take, that would stay behind. Then read the right-hand column: that is what you have actually put in over these years, and it is the part of your reason for staying that looks least like money. Three lines each side, done today.