# Macro Musings notes: how one transferable IOU held up the world that followed Source: Realpha Blog (blog.getrealpha.com) Original article and charts: https://blog.getrealpha.com/en/blog/macromusings-2026-11-16-robin-wigglesworth-on-a-fabulous-debt/ > In the 16 November 2026 episode of Macro Musings, host David Beckworth talks with Robin Wigglesworth, editor of FT Alphaville, about his new book A Fabulous Debt: BIS data put the global bond market at around $188 trillion at the end of 2025, larger than global equities and larger than the banking system. The first tradable bond appeared in Venice in 1171 at 5% a year, the war it financed was lost, the principal was never repaid, and the Doge who issued it was killed by his own citizens. Educational notes, not investment advice, no tickers, no price targets, and my reading may be wrong. Published: 2026-11-16 Locale: en Tags: bond market, financial history, podcast notes, government debt, sovereign credit ![Early morning at the Rialto market in Venice, a merchant in the foreground handing a folded sheet closed with a wax seal to another man in slanting dawn light, the same arcade running away into the distance until the stalls dissolve into haze](/covers/macromusings-2026-11-16-robin-wigglesworth-on-a-fabulous-debt-cover.png) > A national debt, if it is not excessive, will be to us a national blessing; it will be a powerful cement of our union. > > —— Alexander Hamilton, letter to Robert Morris (1781) In the 16 November 2026 episode of *Macro Musings*, David Beckworth brings on Robin Wigglesworth, editor of FT Alphaville, to talk about his new book *A Fabulous Debt*. The numbers Wigglesworth gives on the show: BIS data put the global bond market at about $188 trillion at the end of 2025, bigger than global equities and bigger than the banking system, with US Treasuries around $35 trillion and total US public debt having just crossed $40 trillion. Private credit and crypto run two to three trillion each — ants next to the elephant, in his phrase. His claim is that the bond made governments and their citizens into bound counterparties and squeezed out transparency and accountability, and after listening I think that claim rests on a condition he leaves half-stated: the creditors have to live in town. ![Four horizontal bars ranked by size: the top bar spans almost the full width and stands for the global bond market at roughly $188 trillion, the second is only about a fifth of it and is US Treasuries, and the bottom two are so short they are barely visible — private credit and crypto assets.](/figures/bond-market-scale-ant-and-elephant-en.svg) ## The side that borrowed cheaply is the side that won Venice was built by refugees in a swamp. No timber, no stone, nothing a noble wanted, so ingenuity was the only resource left. By the twelfth century it owed religious fealty to Rome while being governed from Constantinople, and it traded with everybody, the Muslim world included, which annoyed everybody. The emperor got annoyed enough to order the arrest of every Venetian he could round up. The Doge at the time, Vitale, was a man who did not want a war; his instinct was to negotiate first. Venice was a republic, though, and when a shipload of escapees sailed in and told the city what had happened, the crowd wanted war. The city was rich and small, and the tax base could not pay for a fleet. So they levied a one-off proportional wealth tax on everyone — and then softened it. Call it a loan: the state pays you 5% a year, and the receipts are transferable. That last clause is the whole invention. You could walk down to the Rialto, where the stalls sold fish and vegetables, and from then on also these receipts — bought by anyone who wanted an income stream, sold by anyone who needed cash, pledged by anyone who needed a loan. ![On the left a receipt grows out of a forced tax levy, then fans out to the right into five paths: buy and collect interest, sell for cash, pledge it to borrow, donate it to the church, and pass it to your heirs — the fanning itself is the shape of transferability.](/figures/transferable-receipt-fans-out-en.svg) Wigglesworth says the uses that grew out of it went past what he expected before the research: endowing a church, leaving it to your heirs, posting it as trade credit. In an era when silver and gold coin ran short, a sheet of paper from a wealthy government that paid 5% every year was close to big money in itself. Buying it became a privilege reserved for Venetian citizens and a few honoured foreigners. Florence, Milan, Genoa, Pisa and Rome copied it wholesale. Then comes the layer he cares most about. Citizens who were creditors had an interest in the state being well run, and the state had an interest in looking legible, so Venice set up a body that published its finances and passed laws ranking creditors behind the city's sailors and soldiers. He says the feedback loop recurs: the best-governed, most transparent city states and nations borrowed most cheaply, and cheap borrowing made them stronger. The Dutch used bonds against the sea, with towns banding into water boards that issued debt to build the dikes and waterways; those boards outlived successive borders and some still exist. The same machinery then funded an eighty-year war of independence against Spain, whose crown was infamous in its own time for defaulting — in 1576 unpaid Spanish troops mutinied and sacked Antwerp. In 1622 the Dutch East India Company issued the oldest corporate bond he could find, five years at 6.5%. He jabs at the stock market in passing: buying an Apple share sends money to another shareholder, so after its first public offering the Dutch East India Company hardly ever issued shares again and funded itself on bonds all the way. Around 1750 the English swapped a mess of old obligations into one homogeneous 3% perpetual, the consols, which he calls the Treasury market before the Treasury market existed and the financial backbone of the British Empire. ![A closed clockwise loop with four nodes in order — citizens become creditors, the books are open, borrowing gets cheap, and there is more capital — and the loop line thickens with each segment to show it compounding.](/figures/transparency-cheap-money-loop-en.svg) ## Read the same stories backwards and they still work Turn the material over and the first bond has an unlovely birth. It was a forced loan sitting on top of a wealth tax, with a transferable receipt stapled on. Then the war was lost: the fleet wintered while the emperor played for time, plague swept it, thousands died, and the survivors sailed home having freed nobody — and carrying the plague back with them. At the public inquiry in 1172 one citizen after another shouted at the Doge, his advisers tiptoed toward the exits, and when he finally made a dash for it he was caught in the streets of his own city and murdered. Wigglesworth's joke is that financial innovators get no respect whatsoever, and most of them at least don't get stabbed to death at home. He declines the strong version himself. Saying the bond market ushered in European democracy would be "comically overdone," he says; he will put it down as one small-f factor among many. Spain is the harder case. Philip II was famous among his contemporaries as a cunning administrator rather than a spendthrift royal, and he defaulted several times anyway. Later historians going through the ledgers found that the German and Italian banking families extracted such good rates, and sometimes collateral, that lending to him again and again was less mad than it looks. That takes a piece out of "cheap money is the reward for good governance": the price a lender quotes reflects what the lender can earn off you, which can come apart from how well you govern. The weight of Antwerp needs discounting too — Wigglesworth compares it to tea going into Boston Harbor, symbolically enormous, with its financial and military importance open to debate. ![Two arrows feed into the same outcome, "the money keeps coming": the upper one comes from transparent governance and open books, the lower one from lenders getting high rates and collateral, and the lower path is marked in a warning colour.](/figures/two-reasons-the-money-keeps-coming-en.svg) And there is the thing I keep falling for when reading history: survivors. The episode is about Venice, the Dutch and the British, all winners. As for the counterfactual, he says he thought about it and couldn't write it — had Venice won quickly, raided the treasury at Constantinople and repaid the loan the next year, maybe the Venetians would still have noticed the magic of a tradable fixed income security, and maybe not. We don't know. Even today's version of the claim, that the bond market disciplines governments, comes conditioned on the show. Asked whether he has a good theory of interest rates, he says no, he has ten and picks whichever suits him that day. He attributes this year's selloff to resilient global growth, inflation running above most central banks' targets, and the energy shock from the war in Iran, and he thinks people who saw break-evens move maybe 20 basis points were too quick to call the whole move real — that reading ignores the Fed's remaining credibility, with Kevin Warsh signalling the problem would be taken seriously. Which means who the bond market is punishing and how much credit the central bank has left are tangled together. ![A horizontal waterline, with three named circles floating above it — Venice, the Dutch Republic and Britain — and a row of unnamed grey circles marked with question marks sunk below it, standing for the cases never written into the books.](/figures/survivors-above-the-waterline-en.svg) ## The half I think holds, and what it rests on Here's where a lot of us get stuck. Ten-year yields spike and the news says the bond market is disciplining the government; yields come back down and the same voices say the market has relaxed. Watching that one curve go up and come back this year taught me how little of that commentary I can lean on. The half I'm keeping is that transferability is the mechanism. A receipt that changes hands has a price every day, and a daily public price gives the borrower a reason to open the books. Venice set up a body to publish its finances because its receipts were being bid on at the Rialto. So when I read that the bond market is disciplining someone, I ask three things first: who the creditors are, whether the price is continuous and public, and whether those creditors live in town. Today's Treasury market clears the first two. The third is getting subtle — Beckworth mentions in the intro that Wigglesworth recently wrote a long piece on the growing role of hedge funds in the Treasury market and the challenges that presents. Venice's and Holland's creditors were local taxpayers who could shout at their own government; Philip II's were foreign bankers who wanted a good price and collateral, and had no reason to care how Spanish finances were run. ![A grid matching three questions against three cases: Venice and the Dutch Republic pass all three cells, Philip II's Spain fails the third, and today's US Treasuries pass the first two while the third is a question mark.](/figures/three-questions-grid-en.svg) That set of conditions gives me something checkable, which wears better than a single-cause story. His ten theories of interest rates are worth copying down too: one price's move leaves room for several explanations, while the three questions have answers I can go and look up. So the next time yields move hard, I'll work through those three first and read the commentary afterwards. ## Sources worth reading - *Macro Musings with David Beckworth*, episode of 16 November 2026 — the source for these notes - Robin Wigglesworth, *A Fabulous Debt: The Epic Story of How Bonds Built the Modern World* - His earlier book *Trillions*, on the history of index funds and passive investing - *The Story of Money*, the financial history podcast he co-hosts with Gillian Tett - The BIS international debt securities statistics - William Roberds and Stephen Quinn, *How a Ledger Became a Central Bank*, on the Bank of Amsterdam — Beckworth's recommendation on the show - Wigglesworth's recent FT piece on hedge funds and the Treasury market ## One thing to take with you A promise starts to carry weight once a third person is holding it. The Venetian receipt pulled the government's books into the open because somebody was bidding on it in the market — being watched is what forced the issuer to explain itself. A promise you've only made to yourself has none of that, so you can revise it quietly and never notice you did. ![Two panels side by side: on the left a person and their own promise sit inside a dashed circle with the arrow curling back to themselves, so it can be quietly revised; on the right the promise is handed to a third person, and an arrow comes back to ask about it at month end.](/figures/promise-needs-a-third-hand-en.svg) Something I've tried: take one thing you've only told yourself — finishing that book this month, walking three times a week, making the phone call you keep postponing — write it in one line to a friend, and ask them to check in on the last day of the month. The weight is in that second half: hand the act of checking to somebody else. The first time I did it, I wanted to hide on the day they asked.